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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN H. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
CORNWALL WAREHOUSE
COM·PANY and
ERNEST JAME'S,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10176

APPE·LLANTS' BRIEF
ST~TEMEN'T

OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and
property damage arising from an intersection collision at Second South and Third West in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court made and entered judgment in
favor of Calvin H. Johnson and against the Defendants-Appellants and denied the Motion for a New
Trial of the Defendants-Appellants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants want the following:
A. The judgment entered in favor of the
Plaintiff-Respondent on April 28, 1964 vacated,
1
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B. The Lower Court directed to grant the De
fendants-Appellants' Motion for a New Trial.
STA'TE,MEN'T OF MA:TERIAL FACTS
This case has been tried twice, and previously
in Case No. 99,21 this dispute was before this Court.
,The accident happened at about 4 :45 P.M. on
May 31, 19'6'2 (R. 428) at the intersec'tion of Second
'South and 'Third West in Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibit 2D'l). The streets at this intersection are level
(Exhibit '2 D1). Visibility was not obstructed, and
Mr. Johnson testified there was no obstruction to
seeing Mr. James' truck or any other vehicle going
south on ,Third West (R. 506). At the time of the
accident, Mr. Johnson was driving his vehicle in an
easterly direction on Second South (R. 504) at a
speed of '20 to '25 m. p.m. ( R. 505). He was using
the inside eastbound lane ( R. 505), and there was
no traffic to his right in the outside eastbound lane
(R. 505). There were no poles on the northwest
corner df the intersection or no cars that blocked
Mr. Johnson's vision or that would obstruct his
a;bility to see Mr. James' truck (R. 506).
At the intersection of Second South and 'Third
West, Second South Street is 92 feet wide, and Third
West is H2 feet wide (Exhibit 2D1). Officer Nicholson found the point of impact to he 77' 10" east
of the west curb of Second Sou'th (Exhibit 2'DI1)
and 5'6' 2" south of the north curb of Second South
(Exhibit '2D'l).
Mr. Johnson testified (R. 511) that his car,
1

1
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when he first observed the truck stopped at the stop
sign, or wherever it was stopped, was some 150 to
200 feet west of the west curb of Third West. Officer Nicholson testified that Mr. Johnson told h'im
he did not see the truck again until he was in the
intersection and at a time when he, Mr. Johnson,
was three quarters of the way across it. At that
time ( R. 41 5) the truck was only three feet from
the side of Mr. Johnson's car, and he had no time
to take any evasive action ('R. 415).
1

Mr. James entered the intersection from the
north. He was driving a Chevrolet truck and stopped before entering the intersection (R. 429). On
Exhibit 2Dl (R. 480), Mr. James drew a symbol of
the truck to show where he stopped, with the front
of his truck north of the pedestrian lane. Mr. James
waited at the intersection three or four minutes
(R. 432) durin'g heavy traffic. His truck was the
only truck there (R. 432), and before entering the
intersection, he allowed six or seven westbound cars
to pass across the intersection and five or six eastbound cars (R. 432) Mr. James saw Mr. Johnson's
car before entering, and at that time it was back
of the fifth set of tracks shown on Exhibit 2·D 1.
He marked his initials (E'J) to indicate the point
on the diagram (Exhibit 2D 1) to _show the location of Mr. Johnson's car. where he noticed it prior
to entering the intersection. From the time Mr.
James saw Mr. Johnson's car where the in'itials
(EJ) are marked on Exhibit 2D1 until the time of
3
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the impaet, he did not see it again (R. 4'34). Mr.
James accelerated from the time he left the spot
where his truck was stopped to the time of the impact and stated his speed was about 10 m.p.h. at
the time of the impact ( R. 4'3'6) .
Exhibit 2Dl also in red shows the position of
the vehicles after the collision.
The trial court gave ·50 instructions to the jury
(R. 32'5- 'R. 375), inclusive.
With respect to right-of-way the court in Instruction 27, ( R. 3'5'3), instructed the jury as follows:
INSTR'UGTION No. 27
'''The Laws of the State of Utah provide
that where a driver has driven past a stop
sign into an intersection and a collision occurs, the collision shall he deemed prima facie
evidence of the failure to yield the right of
way on the part of the driver passing the stop
sign but shall not be considered negligence per
se in determining legal liability for such accident."
1

Additionally, the court gave Instruction No. 28,
('R. 354) which reads as follows:
INSTRUCTION No. 28
''The terms, 'prima facie evidence of failure to yield the right of way,' and, 'negligence per se,' contained in the foregoing statute need clarification as they relate to this
accident. The term, 'prima facie,' means, on
the face of it; so far as can be judged from
the first disclosure; or, presumably. 'The term,
4
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'per se,' means, in itself; taking it alone · or
unconnected with other rna tters.
' '
"As applied to this case, you must find
nnde1· t~~ sta_tute .read to.yo'lt .that the fact of
the c~lhst?n 1s pr1~ facte evzdence of defendants fatlure. to yteld the .right of tcay and,
hen_ce, neghg.ence on thetr par:t. This prima
facie evidence Is a form of evidence and if
there is none other tending to overcome it; or
if this evidence of failure to yield the right
of way preponderates over contrary evidence,
it would require a finding of failure to yield
the right of way on the part of defendants
and, hence, a finding of negligence on their
part and would require a verdict for the plaintiff, unless you also 'found that such negligence, though existing, was not the proximate
cause of the accident or that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as I have defined
those terms to you." '(emphasis added)

ot

The Defendants excepted and objected to Instructions 27 and ·28. ( R. 568-569).
In arguing the case to the jury in the closing
argument, Mr. Hunt stated with respect to right
of way (R. 5'57).
"In other words, if when the truck entered Johnson was so close that he was a hazard then of course, we know that the truck
dri~er w~s negligent. And I'm going to ask
you, when you go in the jury room, to read
"2·7" through "31" becau.se there's la~guage
in there that hits the crucial part of this case.
Twenty-seven says, 'The laws of Utah provide that where a driver has driven past the
stop sign - ' that's the stop sign that the
1
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truck driver did- 'into an intersection and
a collision occurs,' which he did, 'the collision
shall be deemed prima facie evidence of failure to yield the right of way on the part of
the driver passing the stop si'gn, but shall
not be considered negligence per se in determining legal liability for such accident.
"'Tn other words, the fact of the accident
is evidence, as later instructions tell you, of
the failure to yield on the part of the driver.
And so until and unless they overcome that
presumption, we are only left with the proposition of deciding what should be awarded
Mr. Johnson."
Again in the closing argument (R. '560), Mr.
Hunt again emphasized the importance of Instructions 27 and 2'8, and argued that in view of the instructions, Johnson had the right to assume the defendants' truck entering the intersection, whether
stopped or moving, would yield to Johnson because
Mr. James came from a stop si'gn.
.NRGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DOWER 'COURT ERRED PRE~UTII'CIADLY
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE LAW R'ELATING TO RIGHT OF WAY.

Instructions 27 and 28 which the Lower Court
gave had the effect of directing right of way in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants objected to Instructions 27 and 28 upon the ground they ·contained erroneous statements of the law and were highly pre'judicial ( R. 568). Instructions '2·7 and 28 were
plaintiff's requests (R. 287-'288).
6
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Section 41-6-74 Utah Code Annotated as amend-ed in 1961 reads as follows:
41-6-74. Vehicle entering a through highway. - (a) '''The driver of a vehicle shall
stop as required by this act at the entrance
to a through highway and shall yield the right
of way to other vehicles which have entered
the intersection from said through highway
or which are approaching so closely on said
through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard but said driver having so yielded
may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said
through highway shall yield the right of way
to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the
through highway. (Emphasis added)
('b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at an intersection where a stop
sign is erected at one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway
and shall proceed cautiously, yield right of
way to vehicles not so obliged to stop which
are within the intersection or approach'ing
so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed.''
Paragraph (a) of Section 41-6-74.10 reads
as follows:
"' (a) In the event that a driver, after
having driven past a yield sign or a stop sign,
is involved in a collision with a pedestrian
having right of way in a crosswa}k or a ~c
hicle having right of way in the tn_tersectt~n
such collision shall be deemed pnma facte
evidence of his failure to yield the right of
7
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~vay

as required by this section, but shall not
be considered negligence 'per se in determining
legal liability for such accident." (Emphasis
added)
INSTRU10TION No. 27 ('R. 353)
"The Laws of the State of Utah provide
that where a driver has driven past a stop
sign into an intersection and a collision occurs, the collision shall be deemed prim,a facie
evidence of the failure to yield the right of
way on the part of the driv,er passing the stop
sign but shall not be considered negligence
per se in determining legal liabil'ity :for such
aeciden t." (error emphasized)
INSTRUCTION No. '28 (R. 354)
'~The terms, 'prima fa~cie evidence of failure to yield the right of way,' and, 'n~gligence
per se,' contained in the foregoing statute
need clarification as they relate to this accident. The term, 'prima facie,' means, on the
face of it; so far as can be judged from the
first disclosure; or, presum·ably. 'The term,
'per se,' means, in itself; taking it alone; or,
unconnected with other matters.
"As applied to this case, you must find
under the statute read to you that the fact of
the collision is prima fiacie evidence of defendants' failure to yield the right of way and,
hence, of negligence on their part. This prima
facie evidence is a form of evidence and, if
there is none other tending to overcome it,
or if this evidence of failure to yield the right
of way preponderates over contrary evidence,
it would require a finding of failure to yield
the right of way on the part of defendants
and, hence, a finding of negligence on their
8
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part and would require a verdict for the plaintiff, unless you also found that such negligence, though existing, was not the proximate
cause of the accident or that plaintiff was
contributorily negligence as I have defined
those terms to you." (Emphasis added)
On the last appeal in this same case, the defendants complained about the 1Lower Court giving
Instruction ·9-'L ( R. 51) . Instruction 9-L was as
foHows:
'~The entry of the defendants into a highway controlled by a stop sign and his being
involved in a collision in the intersection, in
this case, is prima facie evidence that plaintiff had 'the right-of-way.
'''We mean by 'prima facie' that on the
face of it, the plaintiff had the right-of-way.
'~If you have in addition to the defendant
entering the con trolled highway, and being
involved in a collision, additional evidence on
the subject of negligence in failing to yield
the right-of-way, you may find that plaintiif
had a right-of-way, and in that event, your
answer would be 'False' on No. 1 tb). But
of you have addi tiona! evidence that overcomes the prima facie evidence, then you are
instructed to find "True" on Proposition No.
1 (b).

'The Green Sheet in Case No. 99'21 (R. 2'73-274)
gives this court's opinion on the first appeal. In
respect to whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negHgence, the court said:
'CiDefendants contend that even though
this court should conclude that under the facts
9
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of this case plaintiff's contributory negligence
was a jury question, nevertheless the jury's
verdict should not be reinstated because the
court prejudicially erred in two of its instructions. We agree.
"'The court instructed the jury that defendant truck driver after stopping at the
stop sign proceeded into the intersection to
make a left-hand turn without keeping a proper lookout for traffic in the position of plaintiff and at a time when it was not safe to
enter and therefore the court found as a matter of law that defendant was negligent. Defendant driver had testified that he saw plaintiff's car crossing the railroad tracks as he
started to enter the intersection to make his
left turn at which time he estimated the car
to be about 200, 150 or 100 feet from the west
curb of Second South and 'Third West Streets
and judged that he had plenty of time to
safely enter and make his turn. In view of
the discrepancies in the evidence as to how
far west of the intersection plaintiff's car
was at the time defendant driver entered the
intersection, it was a fact which the jury
should have determined whether defendant
driver proceeded into the intersection without
keeping a proper lookout and at a time it
was not safe to enter.
~~under the provisions of Sec. 4~-6-74.10,
it is deemed prima facie evidence of failure
to yield the right of way f.or a driver who has
driven past a 'yield' or 'stop' sign and collides
with a car having a right of way in an inteYsection. The court instructed the jury that
the entry of the defendnnt driver 'into a highway controlled by a stop sign and his being
10
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involved in a collision in the intersection, in
this case, is prima facie evidence that plaintiff had the right of way ... ' This instruction is e1-ron eous because it assumes that because plaintiff's entance into the intersection was from a street not regulated by a stop
sign whereas the defendants' vehicle w.as
from such a street, the plaintiff had the right
of way. As we have shown above the evidence
in this case is not such as to warrant a finding as a matter of law as to which driver had
the right of way. Whether plaintiff was or
was not in the intersection or so close thereto
as to constitute an immediate hazard to defendant's entering or proceeding into the intersection was one ror determination by the
jury. If a jury should find that plaintiff was
not in the intersection or so close thereto as
to constitute an immediate hazard when defendants' vehicle entered the intersection,
then plaintiff would not have the right of
way and the collision therein could not be
deemed prima facie evidence of defendants'
failure to yield to such right of way." (emphasis added)
Just as Instruction 9-L at the first trial was an
erroneous statement of the law, Instruction 2'7 was
an erroneous statement of the law at the second
trial, as 1nstruction 27 assumed under the facts
the plaintirf had the right of way. Further. Instruction 28 in effect directed right of way in favor of
the plaintiff, as tha't instruction told the jury the
fact of a collision is prima facie evidence of defendant's failure to yield the right of way, and,
hence, of negligence on their part.
11
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In Bates vs. Burns (19 55) 3 Utah 180, 281
P.'2d 290, where the evidence showed the plaintiff
stopped at a stop sign 125 feet south of the point of
impact and then proceeded northerly into the intersection, and thereafter collided with a westbound
vehicle on Highway 9'1 at the intersection of Highway 114 in Pleasant ~Grove, 'Utah, and where the
evidence showed the plaintiff proceeded at :a speed
of 5 to 6 m.p.h. from the stop sign to the center of
the highway, and where in fact the plaintiff not
only entered the intersection first but had nearly
passed over it before the defendant entered, the
court said the plaintiff was the disfavored driver
until he had entered the intersection at a time when
no car on the through highway had entered or was
so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, but
having entered as authorized, he be·came the favored
driver, and all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway were obliged to
yield the right-of-way to him.
1

At the second trial the evidence was substantially the same as at the first trial. It is undisputed
that Mr. James, before entering the intersection,
made a complete stop and that he waited at the stop
sign north of the pedestrian lane with six or seven
cars going one direction and five or six the other
direction. Mr. James started from ''0" and stated
his speed could have been no more than 10 m.p.h.
at the time of the impact. Exhibit '2,D1 shows that
it is a distance in excess of 80 feet from the place
12
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where the front of Mr. James' truck stopped to the
point of the im·pact. At an average speed of 5 m.p.h.,
his vehicle was going 7. 3'5 feet per second, and it
would have taken the truck slightly more than 10
seconds from the time it started ahead until it
reached the point of impact, which was 77' 10" east
of the west curb of Third West, and 56¥2 feet south
of the north curb of Second South.
Mr. Johnson's speed going east on Second South
was from 20 to 2'5 m.p.h. At '2'5 m.p.h. his vehicle
was going '36. 75 feet per second, or in ten seconds
at that time, his vehicle would have travelled '367¥2
feet to reach the paint of 'Collision. Even if you assume the speed of Mr. Johnson's vehicle was only
20 m.p.h., his vehicle would have been going 29.4
feet per second and would have been '294 feet from
the point of impact at the time the defendants'
truck proceeded into the intersection.
Obviously, under these :£acts, the plain tiff did
not have the right of way as a matter of law, and
hence, the giving of Instructions 27 and 28 were
prejudicial depriving the defendants of their right
to prove the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
in failing to yield the right of way. Further, Instructions 27 and 28 were preijudicial in that they
relieved the plain tiff of any burden of proving he
had the right of way in making a case.
13
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POINT II.
CORRECT INSTRUCTIONS CANNOT CURE ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS.

A correct instruction does not cure an erroneous one. 'This proposition would not he important
except based on the proposition that instructions
are considered as a whole, sometimes the giving of
an incorrect instruction is defended upon the theory
that some other instructions will correct the error.
Admittedly, in this case, 'Correct instructions
on rrght of way were given by the court, but these
instructions did not have the effect of nullifying
the erroneous prejudicial effect of Instructions 27
and 28. Where instructions are incorrect, the jury
is at liberty to follow either the erroneous or the
correct instruction.
In Francis vs. City and County of San Francisco (1955) 44 C;2d 335, 282 P.'2d 49'6, the California Supreme Court said:
"Giving of an erroneous instruction is
not cured by giving of other 'Correct instructions where the effect is simply to produce
a clear conflict in instructions and it is not
possible to know which instruction was followed by the jury in arriving at its verdict.')
In N~eilson vs. Bowles ( 1'951) 124 Colo. 274,
236 P.2d '286, the Colorado Supreme Court said on
ap peal it will be considered that the jury assumed
that all instructions were correct and that they felt
at liberty to roll ow either a correct or an incorrect
instruction.
1

14
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Further, in Pettingell vs. Moede (1954) 129
Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038, the Colorado court said
in respect to inconsistent instructions, one of which
was correct and the other of which was erroneous:
"* * * A jury is to regard all court instructions .and consider them together, and it was
so advised in the instant case; but even a correct instruction cannot cure an erroneous one.
Where it is impossible to determine which line
of reasoning a jury adopted, it likewise is improper to speculate that it selected the correct
theory and disregarded a wrong one."
In Lucas vs. Kirk ('19'6·3) ____ Ala.____ 151 So.
2d 744, the Supreme Court of Al:abama said a charge
which is a misstatement of the law must of necessity be reversible error even when construed in light
of other charges given at appellant's request on
oral charge to the jury.
In Jeronimo vs. Hagerman (1963) 93 Ariz.
357, 3'80 P.'2d 1013, the Arizona Court adopted the
proposition that an unequivocal erroneous instruction was not cured by the mere giving of a correct
instruction concerning the same subject matter elsewhere in the charge.
Instruction 28 given by the ·court was binding
in its effect in that the jury was told you must
find under the statute read you that the fact of the
collision is prima facie evidence of the defendant's
failure to yield the right of way and hence, and of
negligence on their part. Generally speaking, binding instructions of a formula nature are more pre15
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judicial if erroneous than non-binding, non-formula
instructions.
In LeVine vs. Headlee, Jr. (19'64) ____ w. Va ____ _
13'4 'S.E.'2d 892, the court said a binding instruction must be complete in itself, and any omission
from its language cannot be cured by reference
to other instructions given.
In Charvoz vs. Bonneville Irr. Dist. (1951)
t20 Utah 4'80, 2:35 P.2d 780, where an erroneous
instruction was given to the effect the plaintiff
could not recover from a loss arising from a break
in an irrigation canal unless the break was solely
caused by the defendant's negligence, and where it
was well settled law that the defendant would be
liable if his negligence concurred with an act O:f ·God
or negligence of a stranger, and where it was claimed on .appeal the error was cured by a proper instruction and proximate cause, this court said:
~'Assuming that this instruction may be
unobjectionable in a proper case, we cannot
agree that it cured the quite erroneous instruction preceding it. The instruction lays
particular emphasis on persons and makes no
reference to an act of God. Such instruction,
even if construed as one treating concurrency
of causes, is inconsistent so completely as to
substitute confusion for clarity, lend doubt
as to where responsibility could or should be
reposed, and adds to the error already committed. We believe the trial court erred in
failing to give a proper and understandable
instruction on concurring causes."
In Instructions 27 and '28 the trial ·court told
16
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the jury that Mr. Johnson had only to get involved
in a collision to have the right of way, and this obviously confused the jury as to what the law on
right of way was or should be, and left the jury at
liberty to select the instruction on right of way
which it might wish to follow. Further, in his closing argument, Mr. Hunt admonished the jury that
the crucial point of the case could be decided from
reading Instructions 27 to 3'1, and thus, emphasized
the erroneous instructions.
1

POTNT III.
THE P'R IOR DECI SI·ON CONSTITUTES THE TJAW
OF THE C~SE.
1

1

At the retrial, the case was retried on the same
pleadings and the evidence was substantially the
same. No new issues were introduced, and no new
witnesses were called on the factual question, although the plain tiff called 1an addi tiona! medical
witness.
The general rule is that where an appellate
court in a prior opinion states the rule or principle
of law which is directly raised on such appeal and
is necessary :for its decision, the rule as stated in
the prior opinion must be adhered to and followed
throughout all subsequent proceedings, by the trial
court, appellate court, and the parties involved.
In the prior opinion in Case No. ~9'9'2'1, this
court said it was a jury question as to right of way,
and the fact a collision occurred did not mean the
17
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plaintif had the right of way. In fact, the court said
that Instruction 9-L on the prior appeal, which is
substantially the same as Instruction 27, was an
erroneous statement of the law, and that the question of right of way should be submitted to the jury.
In effect, at the retrial, the trial court refused to
follow the opinion of the Supreme Court and permit
the jury to find whether or not Mr. Johnson's vehicle was so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard at the time the defendants' truck entered
the intersection.
In Chipman vs. Amerioan Fork City (1'919) 54
Utah 93, '1'7'9 P. 742 in which the court on a second
.appeal found the pleadings and evidence substantially the same as that on a first trial and appeal,
~and that the trial judge at the second trial had
correctly instructed the jury in conformance with
the prior ruling on appeal, the court held the prior
ruling on appeal constituted the law of the case,
and said that it was immaterial what view the
Supreme Court took on the question of liability on
the second appeal, as the opinion on the first ap··peal was binding.
[In Helper State Bank vs. Crus. (19'38) '9'5 Utah
3·20, 81 P.'2d 3'5~9, the court said ·a previous rulin~
of the reviewing court upon a point distinctly made
is binding on the court on a second appeal and that
where questions of fact and law are the same, the
decision of the first appeal, whether right or wrong,
becomes the law of the case, and on. appeal is bind18
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ing as well on the parties to the action, the trial
court, and the appellate court. To the same effect
is Forbes vs. Butler (19 28) 73 Utah 52'2, 275 P. 7'72.
In Petty vs. Clark (1948) 113 Utah 205, 192
P.2d 589, where on a second trial the case was retried by a different trial judge, the court said on
the second appeal:
"Under the law of the case doctrine, it
is usually held that where ~an appellate court
in its opinion states a rule or principle of law
which is directly raised on such appeal and is
necessary for its decision, that rule or principle must be adhered to and followed throughout 1all subsequent proceedings in such ·case,
both in trial court and in a subsequent appeal even though the court may believe that
it would have been better to have decided the
question differently."
At the second trial the evidence on liability was
substantially the same, and the pleadings were the
same. Further, Instructions 27 and 28 were substantially the same as Instruction 9-L, in that they
contained an erroneous statement of the law. It
follows that ~at the second trial the Lower Court
prejudicially erred in giving Instructions 2·7 and 28,
and did not follow the opinion of the Supreme Court,
which constituted the law of the case.
1

CONIOLUSJON
The defendants should be granted a new trial.
1. The question of right of way depends upon
whether or not the plaintiff's vehicle was so close
1
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as to constitute an immediate hazard at the time
the defendants' truck entered the intersection.
2. The plaintiff wrongfully assumed in requesting instructions, and the Lower Court wrongfully instructed the jury to the effect the plaintiff
had the right of way because the plain tiff was on
an arterial street.
The judgment of the Lower Court should be
reversed because:
1. 'The Lower Court committed error prejudicial to the defendants in instructing the jury that
the laws of the State of Utah provide where a
driver has driven past a stop sign into an intersection and ,a collision occurs, the collision shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of failure to yield the
right of way on the part of the driver passing the
stop sign.

2. The correct instructions on right of way
did not cure the erroneous statements on right of
way in Instructions 27 and 28, ·as the jury was at
Iiberty to follow either instruction.
3. As the facts and pleadings were substantially the same, the Lower Court· was bound .at the
second trial to submit the question of which driver
had the right of ·way to the jury under a proper
instruction, and bound not to direct the jury that
the fact the defendant had driven past a st?P sign
into an intersection and had a collision was prima
20
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facie evidence of the defendant's failure to yield
the right of way.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY,
Attorney for the
Defendants-Appellants
203 Executive Building
455 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
I hereby certify that on this ---------------- day of
August, 19'64, I mailed two copies of this Brief by
United States mail, postage prepaid, to Gayle Dean
Hunt, and two copies to Dwight L. King at the
addresses shown on this Brief.
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